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greenhouse gas emission reduction. These estimates show that climate change initially 
improves economic welfare. However, these benefits are sunk. Impacts would be 
predominantly negative later in the century. Global average impacts would be 
comparable to the welfare loss of a few percent of income, but substantially higher in 
poor countries. There are over 200 estimates of the marginal damage cost of carbon 
dioxide emissions. The uncertainty about the social cost of carbon is large and right-
skewed. For a standard discount rate, the expected value $50/tC, which is much lower 
than the price of carbon in the European Union but much higher than the price of carbon 
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 The Economic Impact of Climate Change 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Climate change is one of the defining issues of the early 21st century. The research effort 
is enormous, and media attention is intense. Climate change is an election issue, and it 
has won people an Oscar and a Nobel Peace Prize. Economic research is centred on three 
questions: What if? So what? What should we do? This paper assesses the first two 
questions. What are the implications of climate change? And how serious is this 
problem? The paper also touches on the third question. What are the elements of an 
optimal climate policy? The paper does not answer these questions. Two decades of 
economic research yielded valuable insights, but only now the scope of the problem has 
become clear. This paper surveys what we know and what we still need to learn about the 
economic impacts of climate change – and what this implies for climate policy. 
 
Climate change is the mother of all externalities, larger, more complex, and more 
uncertain than any other environmental problem. Sulphur dioxide emissions, one of the 
main causes of acidification, arise from impurities in fossil fuels. Sulphur is a nuisance as 
well as an externality. However, thermal energy is generated by breaking the chemical 
bonds in carbohydrates (e.g., oil) and oxidising the components to CO2 and H2O. That is, 
CO2 is intrinsic to fossil fuel combustion. Similarly, methane (CH4) emissions are 
necessary to prevent the build-up of hydrogen in anaerobic digestion. One cannot have 
beef, dairy, or rice without methane emissions. Greenhouse gas emissions are therefore 
fundamental to our food production and our energy system. There are no easy solutions. 
The sources of greenhouse gas emissions are also more diffuse than that of any other 
environmental problem. Every company, every farm, every household emits some 
greenhouse gases. The impacts are similarly pervasive. Agriculture, energy use, health, 
and nature are directly affected by the weather, and this in turn affects everything and 
everyone. Indeed, it cannot be excluded that poor countries are poor partly because they 
are hot. The depletion of the ozone layer is another global externality, but its causes 
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(substances used in a small number of industrial processes and residential applications) 
and consequences (human health, ecosystems) are rather confined. The causes and 
consequences of climate change are very diverse, and those who contribute least are most 
vulnerable. Climate change is therefore not just an efficiency problem, but also an equity 
problem. As the status quo is an unjust externality, the Coasian separation of equity and 
efficiency has little practical value. Climate change is also a long-term problem. Some 
greenhouse gases have an atmospheric life-time of tens of thousands of years, and a small 
part of carbon dioxide will stay in the atmosphere practically forever. Greenhouse gas 
emissions are in this sense comparable to nuclear waste, but the quantities are too large to 
permit the containment approach that is used to store radioactive material. Finally, the 
uncertainties about climate change are vast – indeed so vast that the standard tools of 
decision-making under uncertainty and learning may not be applicable. As all these issues 
come together in the emission of greenhouse gases, climate change truly is one of the 
greatest intellectual challenges of our times. 
 
Therefore this paper cannot possibly cover all economic aspects of climate change. I 
focus on the impacts of climate change, and sketch the implications for policy. Section 2 
reviews the estimates of the total economic impacts. Section 3 surveys the marginal cost 
estimates. Section 4 discusses the many and large research gaps. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Estimates of the total impact of climate change 
 
The first studies of the welfare impacts of climate change were done for the USA (Cline, 
1992; Nordhaus, 1991; Titus, 1992; cf. Smith, 1996). Although Nordhaus (1991; cf. 
Ayres and Walter, 1991) extrapolated his US estimate to the world, and Hohmeyer and 
Gaertner (1992) published some estimates, the credit for the first serious study of the 
global welfare impacts goes to Fankhauser (1994, 1995). Other global estimates were 
published by Nordhaus (1994a,b), Tol (1995), Nordhaus and Yang (1996), Plambeck and 
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Hope (1996), Nordhaus and Boyer (2000), Mendelsohn et al. (2000a,b), Tol (2002a,b), 
Maddison (2003), Rehdanz and Maddison (2005) and Nordhaus (2006).1 
 
There are a dozen studies. The number of authors is lower, and can be grouped into a 
UCL group and a Yale one.2 Most fields are dominated by a few people and fewer 
schools, but dominance in this field is for want of challengers. The impact of this is 
unknown, but this insider argues below that the field suffers from tunnel-vision. This 
situation is worrying. Politicians proclaim that climate change is the greatest challenge of 
this century. Billions of dollars have been spent on studying the problem and its 
solutions, and hundreds of billions may be spent on emission reduction (e.g., Weyant et 
al., 2006). Yet, the economics profession has essentially closed its eyes to the question 
whether this expenditure is justified.3 
 
The reasons for the dearth of research are: 
• lack of funding – this work is too applied for funding by academic sources, while 
applied agencies dislike the typical results and pre-empt embarrassment by not 
funding economic impact estimates; 
• lack of daring – this research requires making many, often questionable 
assumptions, and taking on well-entrenched incumbents; and 
• lack of reward – the economics profession frowns on applied research in general 
and interdisciplinarity in particular. 
 
In addition, many people, including many economists, would argue that climate change is 
beyond cost-benefit analysis (e.g., van den Bergh, 2004) and that monetary valuation is 
unethical (e.g., Spash, 2007; Ackerman, 2008). 
 
                                                 
1 The numbers used by Hope (2006) are averages of previous estimates by Fankhauser and Tol; Stern et al. 
(2006) adopt the work of Hope (2006). 
2 Nordhaus and Mendelsohn are colleagues and collaborators; Fankhauser, Maddison and Tol all worked 
with David Pearce and one another; Rehdanz was a student of Maddison and Tol. 
3 There is a large literature on the economics of climate change, but it is focussed on international 
agreements, policy instruments for emission reduction, and impacts of emission reduction. 
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Table 1 shows selected characteristics of the published estimates. Figure 1 displays these 
estimates against the global mean temperature. A few insights emerge. First, the welfare 
impact of a doubling of the atmospheric concentration on the current economy is 
relatively small. Although the estimates differ, welfare losses are a few percent of GDP 
or less. It is therefore no surprise that cost-benefit analyses of climate change recommend 
only limited greenhouse gas emission reduction – for instance, Nordhaus (1993) argues 
that the optimal rate of emission reduction is 10-15%.4 
 
Second, although the impact is relatively small, is not negligible. A damage of a few per 
cent of GDP per year is a real concern. 
 
Third, some estimates (Hope, 2006; Mendelsohn et al., 2000a,b; Tol, 2002b) point to 
initial benefits of climate change.5 This is more clearly seen in Figure 1. The initial 
benefits are partly because more carbon dioxide in the atmosphere reduces water stress in 
plants and may make them grow faster (Long et al., 2006). Another reason is that the 
global economy is concentrated in the temperate zone, where warming reduces heating 
costs and cold-related health problems. At the same time, the world population is 
concentrated in the tropics, where the impacts of initial climate change are probably 
negative. 
 
Even if, initially, economic impacts may well be positive, it does not follow that 
greenhouse gas emissions should be subsidized as the climate responds rather slowly to 
changes in emissions. The initial impacts cannot be avoided; they are sunk benefits. 
Impacts start falling at roughly the same time emission control affects climate change 
(Hitz and Smith, 2004; Tol, 2002b; Tol et al., 2000). The fitted line in Figure 1 suggests 
that the turning point is at 1.1ºC warming, with a standard deviation of 0.6 ºC. Even 
though total impacts of 1-2ºC warming may be positive compared to today, incremental 
impacts are negative. 
                                                 
4 This is one of the more contentious findings of the climate economics literature. It is rejected by most 
natural scientists and many economists, despite the impeccable pedigree of the estimate and its author. 
5 Studies published after 1995 all have regions with net gains and net losses due to global warming; earlier 
studies only find net losses. 
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The fourth insight is that relative impacts are higher in poorer countries (see also Yohe 
and Schlesinger, 2002).6 This is because poorer countries are less able to adapt to climate 
change (Adger, 2006; Alberini et al., 2006; Smit and Wandel, 2006; Yohe and Tol, 
2002), particularly in health (Tol, 2005). Poor countries are more exposed to climate 
change, particularly in agriculture and water resources. Furthermore, poorer countries 
tend be hotter and therefore closer to biophysical temperature limits and short on spatial 
analogues should it get warmer still. However, there are fewer studies on the impacts of 
climate change on developing countries than on developed countries.7 This has two 
policy implications. Firstly, greenhouse gases mix uniformly in the atmosphere. It does 
not matter where they are emitted or by whom, the effect on climate change is the same. 
Therefore, any justification of stringent emission abatement is an appeal to consider the 
plight of the poor and the impacts imposed on them by the rich (Schelling, 2000). 
Secondly, if poverty is the root cause for vulnerability to climate change, one may 
wonder whether stimulating economic growth or emission abatement is the better way to 
reduce impacts. Indeed, Tol and Dowlatabadi (2001) and Tol and Yohe (2006) argue that 
the economic growth foregone by stringent abatement more than offsets the avoided 
impacts of climate change, at least for malaria, while Tol (2005) shows that development 
is a cheaper way of reducing climate-change-induced malaria than is emission reduction. 
Moreover, richer countries may find it easier and cheaper to compensate poorer countries 
for the climate change damages caused, than to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Such 
compensation may be explicit, but would more likely take the shape of technical and 
financial assistance with adaptation (cf. Paavola and Adger, 2006). 
 
A fifth insight from Table 1 is that impact estimates have become less pessimistic over 
time. The trend is that estimates increase by 0.23% of GDP per year, with a standard 
deviation of 0.10%/yr. There are three reasons for this. Firstly, the projections of future 
emissions and future climate change have become less severe over time – even though 
the public discourse has become shriller. Secondly, the earlier impact studies focused on 
the negative impacts of climate change, whereas later studies considered the balance of 
                                                 
6 Emissions are higher in richer countries. This hampers an international agreement on emission reduction. 
7 Note that some studies (e.g., Rosenzweig and Parry, 1994) assume rather than conclude that poorer 
countries are more vulnerable. 
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positives and negatives. Thirdly, earlier studies tended to ignore adaptation. That is, 
climate changes, but agents continue to do the same thing. Large and negative impacts 
are the result. More recent studies – triggered by Mendelsohn et al. (1994) – include 
adaptation. Climate changes, and agents change their behaviour to minimize losses and 
make the best of the new opportunities. However, agents are typically assumed to have 
perfect foresight, and to be flexible and properly incentivized. Although climate change is 
slow relative to economic and social change, these assumptions may be optimistic. 
Forecasts are imperfect, agents are constrained in many ways, and markets are often 
distorted – particularly in the areas that matter most for the impacts of climate change, 
viz. water, food, energy, and health. Therefore, recent studies may be too optimistic on 
adaptation and thus on the impacts of climate change. The observed trend cannot be 
extrapolated. 
 
The broad agreement between the studies in Table 1 is remarkable as they used different 
methods. The studies by Fankhauser, Nordhaus (1994), and Tol use the enumerative 
method. That is, ‘physical’ impact estimates are obtained one by one, from ‘natural 
science’ papers based on ‘process-based’ models or ‘laboratory experiments’. Physical 
impacts are multiplied with their respective prices, and added up. The ‘prices’ are 
obtained by benefit transfer (see below). In contrast, Mendelsohn’s work is based on 
direct estimates of the welfare impacts, using observed variations (across space) in prices 
and expenditures to discern the effect of climate. Mendelsohn estimates are done per 
sector and then added up, but physical modelling and benefit transfer are avoided. 
Nordhaus (2006) uses empirical estimates of the aggregate climate impact on income, 
while Maddison (2003) looks at patterns of aggregate household consumption. Like 
Mendelsohn, Nordhaus and Maddison rely exclusively on observations, assuming that 
“climate” is reflected in incomes and expenditures. Rehdanz and Maddison (2005) also 
empirically estimate the aggregate impact using self-reported happiness. The difference 
with Nordhaus and Maddison is that their indicator is subjective rather than objective. 
The enumerative studies rely on controlled experiments (albeit with detailed, process-
based models in most cases). This has the advantages of ease of interpretation and 
physical realism, but the main disadvantage is that certain things are kept constant that 
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would change in reality. Adaptation is probably the key element. The statistical studies 
rely on uncontrolled experiments. This has the advantage that everything varies as it does 
in reality, but the disadvantages are that the assessment is constrained by observed 
variations8 and that effects may be spuriously attributed to climate. The broad agreement 
of the estimates from such different methods enhances confidence. 
 
The shortcomings of the estimates in Table 1 are interesting too. Welfare losses are 
approximated with direct costs, ignoring general equilibrium and even partial equilibrium 
effects (see below). In the enumerative studies, impacts are assessed independently of one 
another, even if there is an obvious overlap as between water resources and agriculture. 
Estimates are often based on extrapolation from a few detailed case studies, and 
extrapolation is to climate and levels of development that are very different from the 
original case study. Little effort has been put into validating the underlying models 
against independent data – even though the findings of the first empirical estimate of the 
impact of climate change on agriculture (Mendelsohn et al., 1994) were in stark contrast 
to earlier results (e.g., Parry, 1990). Valuation is based on benefit transfer, driven only by 
difference in per capita income. Realistic modelling of adaptation is problematic, and 
studies either assume no adaptation or perfect adaptation. Many impacts are unquantified, 
and some of these may be large (see below). The uncertainties are unknown – only 5 of 
the 14 estimates in Table 1 have some estimate of uncertainty. These problems are 
gradually solved, but progress is slow. Indeed, the above list of caveats is similar to those 
in Fankhauser and Tol (1996, 1997). 
 
The enumerative method for estimating total impacts uses the inner product of a vector of 
quantities and prices. For traded goods and services, market prices are used. For non-
traded goods and services, other methods are needed. As primary valuation studies are 
expensive, time-consuming, and situation-specific, monetisation of climate change 
impacts relies on benefit transfer. That is, values estimated for other issues are applied to 
climate change concerns. Furthermore, values estimated for a limited number of locations 
are extrapolated to the world, and values estimated for a given period are extrapolated to 
                                                 
8 This particularly limits estimates of the direct impact of higher ambient concentrations of carbon dioxide. 
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the future. This is unavoidable. However, tests of benefit transfer methods have shown 
time and again that extrapolation errors are substantial (Brouwer and Spaninks, 1999). 
There is also a conceptual issue with valuation. Empirical studies have shown that values 
can differ up to an order of magnitude depending on whether one estimates the 
willingness to pay (WTP) for improved environmental services, or whether one estimates 
the willingness to accept compensation (WTAC) for diminished services. There is a 
substantial literature on this matter (cf. Horowitz and McConnell, 2002), and it is now 
clear that this is more than a measurement error. People seem to be averse to risks 
imposed on them by others, and this would drive a wedge between WTP and WTAC. The 
impact studies listed in Table 1 all use WTP as the basis for valuation, as recommended 
by Arrow et al. (1993). Implicitly, the policy problem is phrased as “how much are we 
willing to pay to buy a better climate for our children?” Alternatively, the policy problem 
could be phrased as “how much compensation should we pay our children for 
deteriorating their climate?” Because of the deviation between WTP and WTAC, these 
two questions have different answers. Reducing emissions is more practical than setting 
up an intergenerational compensation fund, and this argues for WTP. However, the WTP 
formulation takes “no emission reduction” as the default, while the WTAC formulation 
takes “no climate change” as the default – WTP thus violates the “do no harm” principle 
that is paramount in ethics and law (Tol and Verheyen, 2004). 
 
Table 1 and Figure 1 make clear that the uncertainty about the impact of climate change 
is vast – just how vast will become clear when the marginal impacts are discussed below. 
The studies that are based on a benchmark warming of 2.5ºC have an average impact of -
0.7% of GDP, and a standard deviation of 1.2% of GDP – note that this is the uncertainty 
about the best estimate of the impacts, rather than the uncertainty about the impacts. Only 
5 of the 14 studies in Table 1 report some measure of uncertainty. Two of these report a 
standard deviation, suggesting symmetry in the distribution. Three studies report a 
confidence interval – of these, two studies find the uncertainty is right-skewed, but one 
study finds a left-skewed distribution. Although there is little and contradictory evidence, 
negative surprises should be more likely than positive surprises. While it is relatively 
easy to imagine a disaster scenario – involving massive sea level rise, mass migration and 
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violent conflict – it is not at all easy to argue that climate change will be a huge boost to 
economic growth. Even though there are no reliable estimates of the uncertainty, it should 
be large and right-skewed. The policy implication is that emission reduction should err on 
the ambitious side. 
 
3. Estimates of the marginal damage cost of greenhouse gas emissions 
 
Although the number of studies of the total costs of climate change is small (Table 1 has 
13 studies and 14 estimates), a larger number of studies estimate the marginal costs: Tol 
(2008) reports 47 studies with 211 estimates, and a few more have been published since 
(Hope, 2008a,b; Nordhaus, 2008; Stern and Taylor, 2007). The marginal damage cost of 
carbon dioxide, also known as the social cost of carbon, is defined as the net present 
value of the incremental damage due to an infinitesimally small increase in carbon 
dioxide emissions. The marginal damage cost equals the Pigou tax if it is computed along 
the optimal trajectory of emissions. Marginal damage cost estimates thus derive from 
total cost estimates. Note that some of the total cost estimates (Maddison, 2003; 
Mendelsohn et al., 2000a,b; Nordhaus, 2006; Rehdanz and Maddison, 2005) have yet to 
be used for marginal cost estimation. Therefore, the 211 estimates of the social cost of 
carbon are based on 9 estimates of the total impact of climate change. The empirical basis 
for the optimal carbon tax is much smaller than is suggested by the number of estimates. 
 
There is only one way to take a first derivative, so how can it be that 9 totals yield 211 
marginals? The total impact of climate change is typically estimated as the difference 
between today’s economy with today’s climate and today’s economy with some future 
climate. The same comparative static estimate of total impact implies different marginal 
costs along different projections of emissions and climate change. Alternative population 
and economic scenarios also yield different estimates, particularly if vulnerability to 
climate change is assumed to change with development. Marginal cost estimates further 
vary with the way in which uncertainty is treated (if at all). Estimates also differ with 
regional aggregation of impacts. Most studies add monetary impacts for world regions, 
which roughly reflects the assumption that emitters of greenhouse gases will compensate 
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the victims of climate change. Other studies add utility-equivalent impacts, assuming a 
social planner and a global welfare function. Different assumptions about the shape of the 
welfare function imply widely different estimates of the social cost of carbon. However, 
the discount rate is the most important source of variation in the estimates of the social 
cost of carbon. This is not surprising as the bulk of the avoidable impact of climate 
change is in the distant future. Besides combinatorial sensitivity analyses with the three 
components of the Ramsey rule for geometric discounting, more recent studies have also 
analyzed numerous variants of hyperbolic discounting. 
 
Table 2 shows some characteristics of the published estimates of the social cost of 
carbon. Following Tol (2008), I fitted a Fisher-Tippett distribution to each published 
estimate using the estimate as the mode and the sample standard deviation. The Fisher-
Tippett distribution is the only parsimonious (two-parameter), fat-tailed distribution that 
is defined on the real line. A few published estimates are negative, and fat-tails seem 
appropriate (cf. Tol, 2003; Weitzman, forthcoming). The joint probability density 
function follows from addition, using weights that reflect the age and quality of the study 
as well as the importance that the authors attach to the estimate – some estimates are 
presented as central estimates, others as sensitivity analyses or upper and lower bounds. 
 
Table 2 reaffirms that the uncertainty about climate change is very large. If all estimates 
are included, this is partly explained by the use of different pure rates of time preference. 
However, as is shown by the estimates for three subsamples of the data using the same 
pure rate of time preference, time discounting is only part of the uncertainty. For a 3% 
pure rate of time preference, the mean social cost of carbon is $50/tC, and the median is 
$37/tC. However, the 99%ile is $271/tC. That is, the uncertainty is large and right-
skewed. For a 1% pure rate of time preference, these numbers are more than twice as 
high. If the pure rate of time preference is lowered further, to 0%, estimates increase 
further – but by less than one might have expected, because most estimates are 
(inappropriately) based on a finite time horizon.9 Table 2 shows that the estimates for the 
                                                 
9 With an infinite time horizon, the social cost of carbon would still be finite as fossil fuel reserve are finite 
and the economy would eventually equilibrate with the new climate. 
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whole sample are dominated by the estimates based on lower discount rates. Note that 
there is one estimate (Hohmeyer and Gartner, 1992) based on a zero consumption 
discount rate (cf. Davidson, 2006) and thus a negative pure rate of time preference. 
 
To place these numbers in their context, new power plants would be carbon-free for a 
carbon tax of $50-100/tC (Weyant et al., 2006) while transport would decarbonise only at 
a much higher carbon tax (Schaefer and Jacoby, 2005, 2006). Substantial emission 
reduction requires a carbon tax of at least $50/tC, and can barely be justified with a pure 
rate of time preference of 3%. Note that the social cost of carbon is a global estimate – 
the contribution of each country to the damages is smaller. 
 
4. Research needs 
 
4.1. Higher order impacts 
 
The literature reviewed above is largely limited to estimates of the direct costs, that is 
price times quantity, with constant prices. This is a crude approximation of the welfare 
impact. General equilibrium studies of the effect of climate change on agriculture have a 
long history (Kane et al., 1992; Darwin, 2004). These papers show that markets matter, 
and may even reverse the sign of the initial impact estimate (Yates and Strzepek, 1998). 
Bosello et al. (2007) and Darwin and Tol (2001) show that sea level rise would change 
production and consumption in countries that are not directly affected. Ignoring the 
general equilibrium effects leads to small negative bias in the global welfare loss, but 
differences in regional welfare losses are much greater and may be negative as well as 
positive. Similarly, Bosello et al. (2006) show that the direct costs are biased towards 
zero for health, while Berrittella et al. (2006) emphasize the redistribution of impacts on 
tourism through markets. More research alone these lines is needed. 
 
A cross-sectional analysis of per capita income and temperature may suggest that people 
are poor because of the climate (Nordhaus, 2006; van Kooten, 2004). This would, 
wrongly, suggest that warming could cause economies to shrink or grow slower. This 
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would increase the damages of climate change. As poverty implies higher impacts, this 
would drag the economy down further. However, as shown in Fankhauser and Tol 
(2005), only very extreme parameter choices would imply such a scenario. This is in 
sharp contrast to the econometric results of Dell et al. (2008), who find conclude that 
climate change would slow the annual growth rate of poor countries by 0.6 to 2.9 per cent 
points. Accumulated over a century, this effect would dominate all earlier impact 
estimates. Unfortunately, Dell et al. (2008) have only few explanatory variables in their 
regression, so their climate effect may suffer from missing variable bias. Gallup et al. 
(1999) and Masters and McMillan (2001) find a relationship between geography and 
development, but Easterly and Levine (2003) show that the results are not robust, and that 
institutions are a better explanation of income difference than is geography and climate. 
Acemoglu et al. (2002) reach the same conclusion. However, Acemoglu et al. (2001; cf. 
Albouy, 2008) argue for climate as a root cause of development, via the route of the 
mortality of European settlers. Future climate change will not affect history, though. 
Demo-economic models (Galor and Weil, 1999) also put mortality10 centre stage. In their 
models, the difference between Malthusian stagnation and exponential growth is 
determined by the quality-quantity trade-off for children, which is partly driven by infant 
mortality. A risk-averse parent would opt for more children, so as to increase the chance 
of old-age care; a large number of inadvertently surviving children would reduce the 
money spent on their education. These children would become poor adults, unable to 
afford health care for their offspring. Should climate change increase the prevalence of 
malaria and diarrhoea, then the poverty trap would widen. This mechanism has not been 
studied for climate change, but the impact of climate change on economic growth may 
dominate the static impacts shown in Table 1. 
 
4.2. Missing impacts 
 
The impacts of climate change that have been quantified and monetised include the 
impacts on agriculture and forestry, water resources, coastal zones, energy consumption, 
air quality, and human health. Obviously, this list is incomplete. Also within each impact 
                                                 
10 albeit of infants, not of grown settlers from distant places 
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category, the assessment is incomplete. Studies of the impacts of sea level rise on coastal 
zones, for instance, typically omit saltwater intrusion in groundwater (Nicholls and Tol, 
2006). Furthermore, studies typically compare the situations before and after climate 
change, but ignore that there will be substantial period during which adaptation is 
suboptimal – the costs of this are not know. 
 
Some of the missing impacts are most likely negative. Increasing water temperatures 
would increase the costs of cooling power plants (Szolnoky et al., 1997). Redesigning 
urban water management systems, be it for more of less water, would be costly (Ashley et 
al., 2005), as would implementing the safeguards against the increased uncertainty about 
future circumstances. This is true for other infrastructure as well. Extratropical storms 
may increase, leading to greater damage and higher building standards (Dorland et al., 
1999). Tropical storms do more damage, but it is not known how climate change would 
alter the frequency, intensity, and spread of tropical storms (McDonald et al., 2005). 
Ocean acidification may well harm fisheries (Kikkawa et al., 2004). These matters are 
relatively small compared to overall economic activity. Even if climate change would 
double or triple the cost, the impact would be small. 
 
Other missing impacts are probably positive. Higher wind speeds in the mid-latitudes 
would decrease the costs of wind and wave energy (Breslow and Sailor, 2002). Less sea 
ice would improve the accessibility of arctic harbours, would reduce the costs of 
exploitation of oil and minerals in the Arctic, and may even open up new transport routes 
between Europe and East Asia (Wilson et al., 2004). Warmer weather would reduce 
expenditures on clothing and food, and traffic disruptions due to snow and ice 
(Carmicheal et al., 2004). Also in these cases, the impact of climate change is likely to be 
small relative to the economy. 
 
Some missing impacts are mixed. Tourism is an example. Climate change may well drive 
summer tourists towards the poles and up the mountains, which amounts to a 
redistribution of tourist revenue (Berrittella et al., 2006). Other impacts are simply not 
 14
known. Some rivers may see an increase in flooding, and others a decrease (Kundzewicz 
et al., 2005).  
 
These are the small unknowns. There may also be big unknowns: biodiversity loss, 
extreme climate scenarios, violent conflict, and the very long term. The impact of climate 
change on economic development, discussed above, may also be included among the “big 
unknowns”. 
 
Climate change would have a profound impact on nature. Plants and animals are directly 
affected temperature and precipitation, and indirectly through interactions with other 
organisms. Climate change implies changes in distribution and abundance, invasions, and 
local and global extinctions (Gitay et al., 2001). Economists have problems with this. 
First, there are few quantitative studies of the impacts of climate change on ecosystems 
and biodiversity because quantitative ecology is still in its infancy, and there are many 
species to be modelled. Second, changes in land use and nutrient cycles, alien invasions 
and acidification also have large-scale and profound effects on nature. This hampers 
interpretation of past observations, complicates projections of the future, and muddles the 
attribution of impacts to causes (Parmesan and Yohe, 2003). Third, valuation of 
ecosystem change is difficult. Over the years, methods and applications have grown more 
specific (e.g., Champ et al., 2003) while benefit transfer remains difficult (Brouwer and 
Spaninks, 1999). Wide-spread change that is hard to detect and to attribute is beyond 
current valuation methods. Nevertheless, valuation studies have consistently shown that, 
although people are willing to pay something to preserve or improve nature, they are not 
prepared to pay a large amount. Most studies put the total willingness to pay for nature 
conservation at substantially less than 1% of income (Pearce and Moran, 1994). Even if 
climate-change-induced biodiversity loss would be worth as much as 1% of GDP, this 
would not fundamentally change the total impact estimates of climate change. 
 
Extreme climate scenarios are another big unknown. Examples are a shutdown of the 
thermohaline circulation (e.g., Marotzke, 2000), a collapse of the West-Antarctic Ice 
Sheet (Vaughan and Spouge, 2002), and massive releases of methane from the permafrost 
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(e.g., Harvey and Huang, 1995). These scenarios have a number of things in common. 
First, they would lead to rapid changes in the natural system. Second, impacts have 
hardly been studied. Third, the mechanism is only partially understood. Fourth, the 
probability is unknown but probably low. Rapid climate change would be a problem, as 
there would be little time to adapt. This suggests that impacts would be large. Impact 
models, however, have been designed for more gradual climate change. Nicholls et al. 
(forthcoming) find that the impacts of sea level rise sharply increase should the West-
Antarctic Ice Sheet collapse, but they may have overestimated adaptation and hence 
underestimated impacts (Olsthoorn et al., forthcoming). Link and Tol (2004) estimate the 
impacts of a shutdown of the thermohaline circulation which slows global warming, at 
least over land. Unsurprisingly, they report benefits of a THC shutdown. 
 
Research into the determinants of violent conflict has concluded that resource scarcity is 
at best a contributing factor to, but never a cause of war (Alesina and Spolaore, 2005; 
Collier and Hoeffler, 1998; Homer-Dixon, 1994). The corollary is that climate-change-
induced resource scarcity would not lead to war either, although it may intensify pre-
existing conflicts. It is therefore impossible to estimate the impact of climate change on 
violent conflict without a scenario with background conflicts. Such scenarios do not exist; 
all future scenarios for climate change are nice and peaceful (Nakicenovic and Swart, 
2001). Clearly, an intensification of conflict would be something to worry about. 
Butkiewicz and Hanakkaya (2005) find that political instability (i.e., the chance of war) 
may decrease per capita economic growth in the poorest countries by 2% per year – 
although actual war has no significant effect. Conflict may thus dominate climate change 
impacts, but, as said, it is not clear whether climate change would lead to conflict. 
 
The fourth big unknown is the impact in the very long term. Most static impact analyses 
are for 2xCO2 only, while most dynamic impact studies stop at 2100. Climate change will 
not stop there, but most estimates for 2100 suggest that climate change has a negative 
impact, that the impact is growing, and that the growth rate is accelerating – see Figure 1. 
Obviously, what happens after 2100 is important for climate policy, but we have not even 
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started to study this – this is true for emissions, for climate change, for impacts, and for 
the monetary value of those impacts. 
 
4.3. Welfare 
 
The information gaps described above require research that combines economics with 
other disciplines. There are two issues that are pure economics. Both have to do with the 
specification of the welfare function. 
 
The impacts of climate change are uncertain, but will likely fall heaviest on poorer 
countries (cf. Table 1). In textbook economics, attitudes towards uncertainty are 
measured by the rate of risk aversion, or the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to 
consumption. The same parameter plays an important role in the Ramsey discount rate, as 
it also partly governs the substitution of future and present consumption. Furthermore, 
this parameter drives the trade-offs between differential impacts across the income 
distribution, both within and between countries.11 The consumption elasticity of marginal 
utility thus plays four roles. Although conceptually distinct, all climate policy analyses 
that I am aware of use a single numerical value (cf. Saelen et al., 2008). The reason for 
this is simple. It is well known that consumption smoothing over time and risk aversion 
are different things, and different again from inequity aversion – and that attitudes 
towards income gaps are different within and between jurisdictions (e.g., Amiel et al., 
1999). Despite considerable research, welfare theorists have yet to find welfare and utility 
functions that make the necessary distinctions and can be used in applied work. Climate 
change adds urgency to solving the theoretical problems. 
 
There is a similar problem with population. Standard welfare functions work fine if 
population growth is exogenous, but produce peculiar and undesirable results if 
population is endogenous (Blackorby and Donaldson, 1984). As climate change affects 
                                                 
11 The differences in impacts between countries are described above. Although research is scarce (O’Brien 
et al., 2004), there is no reason to assume that climate change impacts would be homogeneous within 
countries; certainly, certain economic sectors (e.g., agriculture), regions (e.g., the coastal zone) and age 
groups (e.g., the elderly) are more heavily affected than others. 
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mortality and migration, population is endogenous to climate policy. A standard welfare 
function such as W = Pln(C/P), with W welfare, P population and C total consumption, 
would put a premium on migration from poor to rich countries and would thus encourage 
sea level rise and discourage coastal protection. As above, this problem is well recognised 
in welfare theory, but a practical solution has yet to be found. 
 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
 
Research into the economic impacts of climate change began in earnest with the 
publication of Nordhaus (1991). The tone of the survey of Pearce et al. (1995) suggest 
that the authors (including the present one) thought that everything was roughly known, 
and that research would be complete within a few years. This view was entirely mistaken. 
After 17 years of research, I am reasonably confident that we know the scope of the 
research agenda. As argued above, there are a number of impacts for which we have 
reasonable estimates, and a number of impacts for which we know the order of 
magnitude. We also have a clear idea of the sensitivities of these estimates to particular 
assumptions, even though in some cases we do not really know what to assume. There are 
also a number of issues for which we are aware of our ignorance. I believe that the result 
of 17 years of research is that there are no more unknown unknowns, at least no sizeable 
ones. 
 
This is a sobering conclusion, and I would not be the first expert to suffer from 
overconfidence (Morgan and Henrion, 1990). It is worrying conclusion if one considers 
the amounts of money politicians are proposing to spend on greenhouse gas emission 
reduction. At present, we do not know whether this investment is too much or too little. 
The number of published studies fit on a single page (see Table 1), and none of the 
researchers listed work full-time on this issue. This level of research effort is 
incommensurate with the perceived size of the climate problem, the expected costs of the 
solution, and the size of the research gaps. 
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Nonetheless, decisions should be made with the best available knowledge – even if the 
best available knowledge is not very good. The main advice to policy is given in Table 2. 
A government that plays a cooperative game on climate policy, and uses the same 
discount rate for climate change as for other decisions, should levy a carbon tax of $26/tC 
(mode) to $50/tC (mean). A higher tax can be justified by an appeal to risk (Weitzman, 
forthcoming), but not necessarily by an appeal for a lower discount rate (Nordhaus, 2008, 
Ch 9) or international equity (Schelling, 2000).  The price of carbon dioxide emission 
permits in the European Union is $134/tC.12 In the USA, there is no federal emission 
reduction policy, although utilities apparently factor in a carbon tax of $15/tC in their 
investment decisions (Richels, personal communication). This suggests that neither EU 
nor US policy is optimal, and that the preferred policy lies somewhere in between. 
Outside the OECD, there is no climate policy – although these countries are most 
vulnerable to climate change, and their share of the social cost of carbon is positive even 
at high discount rate. Many of these countries subsidise fossil fuel use, rather than taxing 
it. Weak as the current knowledge on the economic impacts may be, the direction of 
policy adjustments are clear. While this does not constitute “a case for strong action on 
climate change” (Heal, 2008), it does constitute a strong case for action on climate 
change. 
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Figure 1. The 14 estimates of the global economic impact of climate change, expressed as 
the welfare-equivalent income loss with income measured by Gross Domestic Product, as 
a functions of the increase in global mean temperature relative to today. The dots 
represent the estimates. The central line is the least squares fit to the 14 observations: D = 
2.46 (1.25) T – 1.11 (0.48) T2, R2 = 0.51, where D denotes impact and T denotes 
temperature; standard deviations are between brackets. The other two lines are the 95% 
confidence interval, where the standard deviation is the least squares fit to the 5 reported 
standard deviations: S = 0.43 (0.18) T, R2 = 0.58, where S is the standard deviation. 
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Table 2. The social cost of carbon ($/tC); characteristics of the Fisher-Tippett distribution 
fitted to 232 published estimates, and to three subsets of these estimates based on the pure 
rate of time preference. 
 all Pure rate of time preference 
  0% 1% 3% 
Mean 152 148 122 50 
StDev 271 156 149 61 
Mode 41 82 52 26 
33% 38 68 46 20 
Median 88 117 92 37 
67% 149 175 144 56 
90% 347 343 267 114 
95% 539 489 418 204 
99% 1688 669 677 271 
 
Table 1. Impact estimates of climate change; numbers in brackets are either standard deviations or confidence intervals. 
Study Warming Impact Minimum  Maximum  
Nordhaus (1994a) 3.0 -1.3     
Nordhaus (1994b) 3.0 -4.8 
(-30.0 to 0.0) 
    
Fankhauser (1995) 2.5 -1.4 -4.7 China -0.7 Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union 
Tol (1995) 2.5 -1.9 -8.7 Africa -0.3 Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union 
Nordhaus and Yang (1996)a 2.5 -1.7 -2.1 Developing 
countries 
0.9 Former Soviet Union 
Plambeck and Hope (1996)a 2.5 -2.5 
(-0.5 to –11.4) 
-8.6 
(-0.6 to -39.5) 
Asia (w/o China) 0.0 
(-0.2 to 1.5) 
Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union 
Mendelsohn et al. (2000)a,b,c 2.5 0.0 
0.1 
-3.6 
-0.5 
Africa 4.0 
1.7 
Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union 
Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) 2.5 -1.5 -3.9 Africa 0.7 Russia 
Tol (2002) 1.0 2.3 
(1.0) 
-4.1 
(2.2) 
Africa 3.7 
(2.2) 
Western Europe 
Maddison (2003)a,d,e 2.5 -0.1 -14.6 South America 2.5 Western Europe 
Rehdanz and Maddison 
(2005)a,c 
1.0 -0.4 
 
-23.5 Sub-Saharan Africa 12.9 South Asia 
Hope (2006)a 2.5 0.9 
(-0.2 to 2.7) 
-2.6 
(-0.4 to 10.0) 
Asia (w/o China) 0.3 
(-2.5 to 0.5) 
Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union 
Nordhaus (2006) 2.5 -0.9 
(0.1) 
    
a Note that the global results were aggregated by the current author. 
b The top estimate is for the “experimental” model, the bottom estimate for the “cross-sectional” model. 
c Note that Mendelsohn et al. only include market impacts. 
d Note that the national results were aggregated to regions by the current author for reasons of comparability. 
e Note that Maddison only considers market impacts on households.
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